Article

Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data

Pierre Dubois, and Tomislav Vukina

JEL codes

  • D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
  • L24: Contracting Out • Joint Ventures • Technology Licensing
  • Q12: Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
  • K32: Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
  • L51: Economics of Regulation

Replaces

Pierre Dubois, and Tomislav Vukina, Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data, IDEI Working Paper, n. 393, December 2008.

Reference

Pierre Dubois, and Tomislav Vukina, Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 27, n. 4, July 2009, pp. 489–552.

Published in

International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 27, n. 4, July 2009, pp. 489–552