Abstract
We use data from a platform that centralizes day care matching and estimate parents’ preferences and nursery priorities from rank-ordered lists and acceptance decisions. Our novel estimation approach, inspired by dynamic discrete choice models, accounts for strategic behavior. We then evaluate centralized matching policies, comparing mechanisms and assessing the effects of subsidies, increased capacity, and affirmative action. We find that affirmative action is key to increasing participation of disadvantaged children, though it can raise segregation due to strong differences in preferences.
Keywords
day care, affirmative action, segregation, centralized matching markets, CCP estimation;
JEL codes
- C61: Optimization Techniques • Programming Models • Dynamic Analysis
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- I24: Education and Inequality
Reference
Olivier De Groote, and Minyoung Rho, “Matching disadvantaged children to day care: Evidence from a centralized platform”, TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1600, December 2024, revised February 2026.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1600, December 2024, revised February 2026