Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market

Abstract

We build a model where a postal incumbent offering single piece, transactional and advertising mail competes with postal entrants and with a firm offering an alternative medium. We solve for the optimal prices under various competition assumptions. We calibrate the model and provide numerical simulations in order to shed light on the impact of these assumptions on volumes and welfare levels.

Replaced by

Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder, Paul Dudley, and Frank Rodriguez, “Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market”, The Review of Network Economics, vol. 10, n. 3, 2011.

Reference

Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder, Paul Dudley, and Frank Rodriguez, “Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market”, TSE Working Paper, n. 10-148, April 2, 2010.