Working paper

Separation versus Integration in International Rail Markets

A Theoretical Investigation

Guido Friebel, Marc Ivaldi, and Jérôme Pouyet

Abstract

This paper investigates various options for the organization of the railway industry when network operators require the access to multiple national networks to provide international (freight or passenger) transport services. The EU rail system provides a framework for our analysis. Returns-to-scale and the intensity of competition are key to understanding the impact of vertical integration or separation between infrastructure and operation services within each country in the presence of international transport services. We also consider an option in which a transnational infrastructure manager is in charge of offering a coordinated access to the national networks. In our model, it turns out to be an optimal industry structure.

Keywords

Regulation; competition; vertical integration; rail passenger transportation;

JEL codes

  • L51: Economics of Regulation
  • L92: Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
  • R48: Government Pricing and Policy

Reference

Guido Friebel, Marc Ivaldi, and Jérôme Pouyet, Separation versus Integration in International Rail Markets: A Theoretical Investigation, TSE Working Paper, n. 11-248, July 18, 2011, revised March 2013.

See also

Published in

TSE Working Paper, n. 11-248, July 18, 2011, revised March 2013