Abstract
All (random) assignments/allocations without transfers can be considered as market outcomes with personalized prices and an equal income. Prices proportional across agents imply efficiency; common prices lead to efficiency and envy-freeness. This market perspective also reveals a weakness of envy-freeness.
Keywords
allocation without transfers; competitive equilibrium; equal incomes; market perspective; envy-free; Pareto efficient; coalitional-envy-free;
JEL codes
- C78: Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory
- D61: Allocative Efficiency • Cost–Benefit Analysis
- D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Replaces
Yinghua He, Sanxi Li, and Jianye Yan, “Evaluating Assignment without Transfers: A Market Perspective”, TSE Working Paper, n. 15-559, March 2015.
Reference
Yinghua He, Sanxi Li, and Jianye Yan, “Evaluating Assignment without Transfers: A Market Perspective”, Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 133, 2015, pp. 40–44.
See also
Published in
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 133, 2015, pp. 40–44