Abstract
The purpose of this note is to compute the probability of logrolling for three different probabilistic cultures. The primary finding is that the restriction of preferences to be in accord with the condition of separable preferences creates enough additional structure among voters' preference rankings to create an increase in the likelihood that a Condorcet winner will exist with both IC and IAC-based scenarios.
Keywords
Condorcet; Separable preferences; Logrolling; Vote Trading;
JEL codes
- D71: Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations
- D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Replaces
William Gehrlein, Michel Le Breton, and Dominique Lepelley, “The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting”, TSE Working Paper, n. 17-755, January 2017.
Reference
William Gehrlein, Michel Le Breton, and Dominique Lepelley, “The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting”, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49, 2017, pp. 315–321.
See also
Published in
Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49, 2017, pp. 315–321