Abstract
We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.
Keywords
Collusion; Two-sided markets; Cross-group externalities;
JEL codes
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Replaced by
Yassine Lefouili, and Joana Pinho, “Collusion between two-sided platforms”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 72, n. 102656, September 2020.
Reference
Yassine Lefouili, and Joana Pinho, “Collusion between two-sided platforms”, TSE Working Paper, n. 18-894, February 2018, revised July 2020.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 18-894, February 2018, revised July 2020