Résumé
A website monetizes information it collects about its customers by charging third parties for targeted access to them. Allowing for third parties who are well-intentioned, a nuisance, or even malicious, the resulting consumer experiences might be good, bad, or neutral. As consumers learn from experience, the website especially risks losing those customers who suffer a bad experience. Customer retention thus motivates the website to be cautious about monetization, or to spend resources to screen third parties. We study the website's equilibrium privacy policy, its welfare properties, competition in the market for information, and the impact of regulations improving transparency and consumer control.
Mots-clés
Privacy Policy; Consumer Retention; Personal Data; Regulation;
Codes JEL
- D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief
- L15: Information and Product Quality • Standardization and Compatibility
- L51: Economics of Regulation
Référence
Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili et Michael Riordan, « Privacy Protection, Security, and Consumer Retention », TSE Working Paper, n° 18-947, août 2018, révision juin 2020.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 18-947, août 2018, révision juin 2020