Résumé
We develop a search and matching model where matches (jobs) can be formal or informal. Workers choose their level of schooling and search for an employee job either as unemployed or as self-employed. Firms post vacancies in each schooling market, decide the formality status of the job, and bargain with workers over wages. The resulting equilibrium size of the informal sector is an endogenous function of labor market and institutional characteristics. We estimate the model parameters using labor force survey data from Mexico and the exogenous variation induced by the roll-out of a non-contributory social program. Counterfactual experiments based on the estimated model show that eliminating informal jobs increases schooling investments but at the cost of decreasing welfare for both workers and firms.
Mots-clés
Labor market frictions; Search and matching; Nash bargaining; Informality; Returns to schooling;
Codes JEL
- J24: Human Capital • Skills • Occupational Choice • Labor Productivity
- J3: Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- J64: Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- O17: Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional Arrangements
Remplace
Matteo Bobba, Luca Flabbi et Santiago Levy, « Labor Market Search, Informality and Schooling Investments », TSE Working Paper, n° 17-867, novembre 2017, révision juin 2021.
Référence
Matteo Bobba, Luca Flabbi et Santiago Levy, « Labor Market Search, Informality and Schooling Investments », International Economic Review, vol. 63, n° 1, février 2022, p. 211–259.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
International Economic Review, vol. 63, n° 1, février 2022, p. 211–259