Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers

Résumé

This paper examines the signaling role of prices in a context of salient thinking. Consumers cannot observe product quality directly, and they focus on the product attribute – either quality or price – that stands out in the market. Our analysis shows that salience considerations mitigate the incentive to signal quality via price. Moreover, depending on the difference in quality between products, the separating price of the high-quality seller can be inflated or deflated in relation to a set-up of rational consumers. Our findings indicate that certain ways of setting prices for experience goods can be explained by combining price signaling with salient thinking.

Référence

Elias Carroni, Andrea Mantovani et Antonio Minniti, « Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers », Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 138, mars 2023, p. 238–253.