Résumé
Does enhanced access to data foster or hinder competition among firms? Using a competition-in-utility framework that encompasses many situations where firms use data, we model data as a revenue-shifter and identify two opposite effects: a mark-up effect according to which data induces firms to compete harder, and a surplus-extraction effect. We provide conditions for data to be pro- or anti-competitive, requiring neither knowledge of demand nor computation of equilibrium. We apply our results to situations where data is used to recommend products, monitor insuree behavior, price-discriminate, or target advertising. We also revisit the issue of data and market structure.
Codes JEL
- L1: Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L4: Antitrust Issues and Policies
- L5: Regulation and Industrial Policy
Remplace
Alexandre de Cornière et Greg Taylor, « Data and Competition: a General Framework with Applications to Mergers, Market Structure, and Privacy Policy », TSE Working Paper, n° 20-1076, février 2020, révision décembre 2021.
Remplacé par
Référence
Alexandre de Cornière et Greg Taylor, « Data and Competition: A Simple Framework », TSE Working Paper, n° 23-1404, janvier 2023, révision août 2024.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 23-1404, janvier 2023, révision août 2024