Résumé
We analyze the consequences of noisy information aggregation for investment. Market imperfections create endogenous rents that cause overinvestment in upside risks and underinvestment in downside risks. In partial equilibrium, these inefficiencies are particularly severe if upside risks are coupled with easy scalability of investment. In general equilibrium, the shareholders' collective attempts to boost value of individual firms leads to a novel externality operating through price that amplifies investment distortions with downside risks but offsets distortions with upside risks.
Remplace
Elias Albagli, Christian Hellwig et Aleh Tsyvinski, « Imperfect Financial Markets and Investment Inefficiencies », TSE Working Paper, n° 18-891, février 2018, révision février 2023.
Référence
Elias Albagli, Christian Hellwig et Aleh Tsyvinski, « Imperfect Financial Markets and Investment Inefficiencies », American Economic Review, vol. 113, n° 9, septembre 2023, p. 2323–2354.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
American Economic Review, vol. 113, n° 9, septembre 2023, p. 2323–2354