Résumé
We study the feasibility and profitability of predation in a dynamic environment, using a parsimonious infinite-horizon, complete information setting in which an incumbent repeatedly faces potential entry. When a rival enters, the incumbent chooses whether to accommodate or predate it; the entrant then decides whether to stay or exit. We show that there always exists a Markov perfect equilibrium, which can be of three types: accommodation, monopolization, and recurrent predation. We then analyze and compare the welfare effects of different antitrust policies, accounting for the possibility that recurrent predation may be welfare improving.
Mots-clés
predation; accommodation; entry; legal rules; Markov perfect equilibrium;
Codes JEL
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Référence
Patrick Rey, Yossi Spiegel et Konrad Stahl, « A Dynamic Model of Predation », The RAND Journal of Economics, 2024, à paraître.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
The RAND Journal of Economics, 2024, à paraître