Résumé
Derivatives activity, motivated by risk-sharing, can breed risk taking. Bad news about the risk of the asset underlying the derivative increases the expected liability of a protection seller and undermines her risk prevention incentives. This limits risk-sharing, and may create endogenous counterparty risk and contagion from news about the hedged risk to the balance sheet of protection sellers. Margin calls after bad news can improve protection sellers incentives and enhance the ability to share risk. Central clearing can provide insurance against counterparty risk but must be designed to preserve risk-prevention incentives.
Mots-clés
Hedging; Insurance; Derivatives; Moral hazard; Risk management; Counterparty risk; Contagion; Central clearing; Margin requirements;
Codes JEL
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- G21: Banks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages
- G22: Insurance • Insurance Companies • Actuarial Studies
Remplacé par
Bruno Biais, Florian Heider et Marie Hoerova, « Risk-sharing or risk-taking? Counterparty-risk, incentives and margins », The Journal of Finance, vol. 71, n° 4, août 2016, p. 1669–1698.
Référence
Bruno Biais, Florian Heider et Marie Hoerova, « Risk-sharing or risk-taking? An incentive theory of counterparty risk, clearing and margins », TSE Working Paper, n° 14-522, juin 2014.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 14-522, juin 2014