Résumé
We compare the welfare effects in equilibrium of two environmental regulations that aim at increasing the new cars fleet’s average fuel efficiency: the fuel economy standards and the feebate policies. Maintaining the same environmental benefit and tax revenue, we simulate the implementation of each policy in France and the United States. Standard-type policies have larger negative welfare effects, up to 3.2 times those from the feebate. Effects on manufacturers are heterogeneous: some are better of under the standard regulation. The addition of a market to trade levels of fuel efficiency dominates the simple standard regulation but not always the feebate. We also consider the attribute-based standard, technological improvements, and the equivalence with fuel taxes as extensions.
Mots-clés
Environmental regulation; automobile market; structural model; policy simulations;
Codes JEL
- C51: Model Construction and Estimation
- L50: General
- Q51: Valuation of Environmental Effects
Remplacé par
Isis Durrmeyer et Mario Samano, « To Rebate or Not to Rebate: Fuel Economy Standards vs. Feebates? », The Economic Journal, vol. 128, n° 616, décembre 2018, p. 3076–3116.
Référence
Isis Durrmeyer et Mario Samano, « To Rebate or Not to Rebate: Fuel Economy Standards vs. Feebates? », TSE Working Paper, n° 16-732, novembre 2016, révision mai 2017.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 16-732, novembre 2016, révision mai 2017