Résumé
We consider a simple two period model where consumers have different switching costs. Before the market opens, there was an incumbent who sold to all consumers. We identify the equilibrium both with Stackelberg and Bertrand competition and show how the presence of low switching cost consumers benefits the incumbent, despite the fact that it never sells to any of them.
Mots-clés
switching; cost;
Codes JEL
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Remplace
Gary Biglaiser, Jacques Crémer et Gergely Dobos, « Heterogenous switching costs », TSE Working Paper, n° 13-451, décembre 2013, révision octobre 2015.
Référence
Gary Biglaiser, Jacques Crémer et Gergely Dobos, « Heterogenous switching costs », International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 47, juillet 2016, p. 62–87.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 47, juillet 2016, p. 62–87