Résumé
Our model explains the observed gender-specific patterns of career and child care choices through endogenous social norms. We study how these norms interact with the gender wage gap. We show that via the social norm a couple's child care and career choices impose an externality on other couples, so that the laissez-faire is inefficient. We use our model to study the design and effectiveness of three commonly used policies. We find that child care subsidies and women quotas can be effective tools to mitigate or eliminate the externality. Parental leave, however, may even intensify the externality and decrease welfare.
Mots-clés
Social norms; child care; women's career choices; child care subsidies; women quotas; parental leave;
Codes JEL
- D13: Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
- H23: Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- J16: Economics of Gender • Non-labor Discrimination
- J22: Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Remplacé par
Francesca Barigozzi, Helmuth Cremer et Kerstin Roeder, « Women's career choices, social norms and child care policies », Journal of Public Economics, vol. 168, décembre 2018, p. 162–173.
Référence
Francesca Barigozzi, Helmuth Cremer et Kerstin Roeder, « Women's career choices, social norms and child care policies », TSE Working Paper, n° 17-754, janvier 2017.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 17-754, janvier 2017