Résumé
We analyze strategic experimentation in which information arrives through fully revealing, publicly observable “breakdowns.” When actions are hidden, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium that involves randomization over stopping times. With two players, this is the unique equilibrium. Randomization leads to dispersion in actions and to belief disagreement on the equilibrium path. The resulting lack of coordination has significant welfare consequences. In contrast, when actions are observable, the equilibrium is pure and welfare improves.
Mots-clés
Experimentation; free-riding; mixed strategies; monitoring; delay;
Codes JEL
- C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
- D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief
- O33: Technological Change: Choices and Consequences • Diffusion Processes
Remplacé par
Alessandro Bonatti et Johannes Hörner, « Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation », Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 169, mai 2017, p. 234–269.
Référence
Alessandro Bonatti et Johannes Hörner, « Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation », TSE Working Paper, n° 17-791, mars 2017.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 17-791, mars 2017