Résumé
Regulators must often allocate essential inputs, such as spectrum rights, transmission capacity or airport landing slots, which can transform the structure of the downstream market. These decisions involve a trade-off, as provisions aimed at fostering competition and lowering prices for consumers, also tend to limit the proceeds from the sale of the inputs. We first characterize the optimal allocation, from the standpoints of consumer and total welfare. We then note that standard auctions yield substantially different outcomes. Finally, we show how various regulatory instruments can be used to implement the desired allocation.
Mots-clés
Auctions; Market design; Essential inputs; Regulation; Antitrust;
Codes JEL
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44: Auctions
- D47: Market Design
- D61: Allocative Efficiency • Cost–Benefit Analysis
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L42: Vertical Restraints • Resale Price Maintenance • Quantity Discounts
- L43: Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L51: Economics of Regulation
Référence
Patrick Rey et David Salant, « Allocating essential inputs », TSE Working Paper, n° 17-820, juin 2017, révision juin 2019.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 17-820, juin 2017, révision juin 2019