Résumé
We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the constituent games.
Mots-clés
Bargaining; Confirmed proposals; Confirmed agreement;
Codes JEL
- C72: Noncooperative Games
- C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
- C78: Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory
Référence
Giuseppe Marco Attanasi, Aurora Garcia-Gallego, Nikolaos Georgantzis et Aldo Montesano, « Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals », TSE Working Paper, n° 10-192, mars 2010.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 10-192, mars 2010