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Romain Espinosa, and Nicolas Treich

2025, forthcoming

In this paper, we empirically investigate fairness judgments about animals. We design a survey that addresses major challenges associated with the inclusion of animal welfare in public decisions. Collecting data from a representative sample of the French population (N=1,526), we document the views...

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Matthew Adler, Maddalena Ferranna, James K. Hammitt, Eugénie de Laubier, and Nicolas Treich

2025, forthcoming

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Benjamin Ouvrard, Arnaud Reynaud, and Murudaiah Sivamurthy

2025, forthcoming

Using an experimental setting inspired by the empirical social choice literature, we analyze how Indian farmers define fair water allocation. We investigate the choices of 240 Indian farmers who — as a neutral third-party — are asked to make water allocation decisions in situations that differ,...

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Léo Fitouchi, Manvir Singh, Jean-Baptiste André, and Nicolas Baumard

2025

Why do humans believe in moralizing gods? Leading accounts argue that these beliefs evolved because they help societies grow and promote group cooperation. Yet recent evidence suggests that beliefs in moralizing gods are not limited to large societies and might not have strong effects on...

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Christian Gollier

2025, forthcoming

Because of risk aversion, any sensible investment valuation system should value less projects that contribute more to the aggregate risk. In theory, this is done by adjusting discount rates to consumption betas. But in reality, most public institutions use a dis-count rate that is rather...

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Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed

vol. 69, n. 4, 2025, pp. 731–760

Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence towards voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies? I argue that electoral violence acts as a risk-management strategy in competitive authoritarian elections where: (a)...

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Michele Bisceglia, and Salvatore Piccolo

2025, forthcoming

We study a two-period industry where firms are run by agents privately informed about their (persistent) costs, and principals can only use spot contracts. We characterize novel semi-separating equilibria where principals randomize in one or both periods. These equilibria have the following...

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Mengchen Dong, Jane Conway, Jean-François Bonnefon, Azim Shariff, and Iyad Rahwan

2025, forthcoming

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Farid Gasmi, Laura Recuero Virto, and Denis Couvet

2025, forthcoming

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Zohra Bouamra-Mechemache, Olivier de Mouzon, Valérie Orozco, Lola Pedrini, and Marine Spiteri

2025, forthcoming

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