Résumé
We study how career concerns affect the dynamics of incentives in a multi-period contract, when the agent's productivity is a stochastic function of his past productivity and investment. We show that incentives are stronger and performance is higher when the contract approaches its expiry date. Contrary to common wisdom, long-term contracts may strengthen reputational effects whereas short-term contracting may be optimal when investment has persistent, long-term effects.
Mots-clés
Career concerns; contract duration; contract renewal; reputation and dynamic incentives;
Codes JEL
- D21: Firm Behavior: Theory
- D23: Organizational Behavior • Transaction Costs • Property Rights
- D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
- L24: Contracting Out • Joint Ventures • Technology Licensing
- L51: Economics of Regulation
Remplace
Elisabetta Iossa et Patrick Rey, « Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration », TSE Working Paper, n° 12-368, novembre 2012.
Référence
Elisabetta Iossa et Patrick Rey, « Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration », Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 12, n° 3, juin 2014, p. 549–574.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 12, n° 3, juin 2014, p. 549–574