Article

Cooperation Against Theft: A Test of Incentives for Water Management in Tunisia

Wided Mattoussi et Paul Seabright

Codes JEL

  • D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
  • Q13: Agricultural Markets and Marketing • Cooperatives • Agribusiness
  • Q15: Land Ownership and Tenure • Land Reform • Land Use • Irrigation • Agriculture and Environment
  • Q25: Water

Référence

Wided Mattoussi et Paul Seabright, « Cooperation Against Theft: A Test of Incentives for Water Management in Tunisia », American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 96, n° 1, 2014, p. 124–153.

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Publié dans

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 96, n° 1, 2014, p. 124–153