Résumé
We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream manufacturers that produce differentiated goods and downstream retailers that compete imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties. We show that both exclusive dealing and vertical integration between a manufacturer and a retailer lead to vertical foreclosure, at the detriment of consumers and society. Finally, we show that firms have indeed an incentive to sign such contracts or to integrate vertically.
Mots-clés
vertical relations; exclusive dealing; vertical merger; foreclosure; bilateral contracting;
Codes JEL
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L42: Vertical Restraints • Resale Price Maintenance • Quantity Discounts
Remplace
Volker Nocke et Patrick Rey, « Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships », TSE Working Paper, n° 14-515, juillet 2014, révision juin 2018.
Référence
Volker Nocke et Patrick Rey, « Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships », Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 177, septembre 2018, p. 183–221.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 177, septembre 2018, p. 183–221