Organising Competition for the Market

Résumé

The paper studies competition for the market in a setting where incumbents (and, to a lesser extent, neighboring incumbents) benefit from a cost advantage. The paper first compares the outcome of staggered and synchronous tenders, before drawing the implications for market design. We find that the timing of tenders should depend on the likelihood of monopolization. When monopolization is expected, synchronous tendering is preferable, as it strengthens the pressure that entrants exercise on the monopolist. When instead other firms remain active, staggered tendering is preferable, as it maximizes the competitive pressure that comes from the other firms.

Mots-clés

Codes JEL

Remplace

Elisabetta Iossa, Patrick Rey et Michael Waterson, « Organizing Competition for the Market », TSE Working Paper, n° 19-984, janvier 2019.

Référence

Elisabetta Iossa, Patrick Rey et Michael Waterson, « Organising Competition for the Market », Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 20, n° 2, avril 2022, p. 822–868.