Group Size, Collective Action and Complementarities in Efforts

Résumé

We revisit the group size paradox in a model where two groups of different sizes compete for a prize exhibiting a varying degree of rivalry and where group effort is given by a CES function of individual e¤orts. We show that the larger group can be more successful than the smaller group if the degree of complementarity is sufficiently high relative to the degree of rivalry of the prize.

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Remplacé par

Guillaume Cheikbossian et Romain Fayat, « Collective Action, Group Size and Complementarities in Efforts », Economics Letters, vol. 168, juillet 2018, p. 77–81.

Référence

Guillaume Cheikbossian et Romain Fayat, « Group Size, Collective Action and Complementarities in Efforts », TSE Working Paper, n° 18-918, mai 2018.