Résumé
All (random) assignments/allocations without transfers can be considered as market outcomes with personalized prices and an equal income. Prices proportional across agents imply efficiency; common prices lead to efficiency and envy-freeness. This market perspective also reveals a weakness of envy-freeness.
Mots-clés
allocation without transfers; competitive equilibrium; equal incomes; market perspective; envy-free; Pareto efficient; coalitional-envy-free;
Codes JEL
- C78: Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory
- D61: Allocative Efficiency • Cost–Benefit Analysis
- D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Remplace
Yinghua He, Sanxi Li et Jianye Yan, « Evaluating Assignment without Transfers: A Market Perspective », TSE Working Paper, n° 15-559, mars 2015.
Référence
Yinghua He, Sanxi Li et Jianye Yan, « Evaluating Assignment without Transfers: A Market Perspective », Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 133, 2015, p. 40–44.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 133, 2015, p. 40–44