Takuro Yamashita et Shuguang Zhu, « On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms », American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 14, n° 4, novembre 2022, p. 494–514.
Takuro Yamashita et Niccolò Lomys, A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment, EC'22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, juillet 2022, p. 334.
Takuro Yamashita et Alex Smolin, Information Design in Concave Games, EC'22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, juillet 2022.
Takuro Yamashita et Fumitoshi Moriya, « Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations », AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 112, mai 2022, p. 444–451.
Nozomu Muto, Yasuhiro Shirata et Takuro Yamashita, « Revenue-capped efficient auctions », Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 18, n° 3, juin 2020, p. 1284–1320.
Fuhito Kojima et Takuro Yamashita, « Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency », Theoretical Economics, vol. 12, n° 3, 2017, p. 1393–1438.
Takuro Yamashita, « Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies, with Applications to Auctions and Bilateral Trade », The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 82, n° 3, 2015, p. 1223–1246.
Takuro Yamashita, « Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation », Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 159, 2015, p. 267–279.
Takuro Yamashita, « Mechanism Games with Multiple Principals and three or more Agents », Econometrica, vol. 78, n° 2, mars 2010, p. 791–801.
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