Résumé
When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics such as productivity and longevity, the tax administration should partition the population into two groups: One consisting of people who do not receive an inheritance and the other of those who do. The first tagged group gets a second-best tax à la Mirrlees; the second group a first-best tax schedule. The solution implies that receiving an inheritance makes high-ability types worse off and low-ability types better off. High-ability individuals will necessarily face a bequest tax of more than 100%, while low-ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than 100%. With a Rawlsian social welfare function, the low-ability types too face a more than 100% tax on bequests.
Mots-clés
Accidental bequests; estate tax; tagging; first best; second best;
Codes JEL
- H21: Efficiency • Optimal Taxation
Remplacé par
Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari et Pierre Pestieau, « Accidental bequests: a curse for the rich and a boon for the poor », The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 114, n° 4, décembre 2012, p. 1437–1459.
Référence
Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari et Pierre Pestieau, « Accidental bequests: a curse for the rich and a boon for the poor », TSE Working Paper, n° 09-119, novembre 2009.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 09-119, novembre 2009