Résumé
We study collusion among firms against imperfectly monitored environmental regulation. Firms increase variable profits by violating regulation and reduce expected noncompliance penal-ties by violating jointly. We consider a case of three German automakers colluding to reduce the effectiveness of emissions control technology. By estimating a structural model of the European automobile industry from 2007 to 2018, we find that collusion lowers expected noncompliance penalties substantially and increases buyer and producer surplus. Due to increased pollution, welfare decreases by e 1.57–5.57 billion. We show how environmental policy design and antitrust play complementary roles in preventing noncompliance.
Mots-clés
Collusion; regulation; pollution; automobile market; noncompliance;
Codes JEL
- L4: Antitrust Issues and Policies
- L5: Regulation and Industrial Policy
- L6: Industry Studies: Manufacturing
- Q5: Environmental Economics
Référence
Jorge Ale-Chilet, Cuicui Chen, Jing Li et Mathias Reynaert, « Colluding Against Environmental Regulation », TSE Working Paper, n° 21-1204, avril 2021, révision mai 2024.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 21-1204, avril 2021, révision mai 2024