Résumé
The paper makes the case for a more systematic ex-ante assessment of the distribution of gains and losses from efficiency enhancing innovations that regulatory sandboxes are expected to test. It shows how a prior formal modelling of tests can inform the regulators on the possible need to control better upfront in the design of the sandbox for some otherwise underestimated but predictable distributional effects. Failing to do so is likely to lead to underestimate efficiency-equity trade-offs and other distributional issues, across stakeholders or within groups of stakeholders. Simple Industrial Organization models will often suffice to identify the potential issues at an early stage and allow better sandboxes designs and hence more reliable policy relevant results.
Mots-clés
Regulatory sandboxes; innovation; governance; anti-trust; regulation; efficiency; equity; quality standards;
Codes JEL
- K20: General
- K21: Antitrust Law
- K23: Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L12: Monopoly • Monopolization Strategies
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L15: Information and Product Quality • Standardization and Compatibility
- L51: Economics of Regulation
- O31: Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O33: Technological Change: Choices and Consequences • Diffusion Processes
Référence
Claude Crampes et Antonio Estache, « Efficiency vs. equity concerns in regulatory sandboxes », TSE Working Paper, n° 23-1466, septembre 2023.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 23-1466, septembre 2023