Résumé
There is widespread evidence that some firms use false advertising to overstate the value of their products. Using a model in which a policymaker is able to punish such false claims, we characterize a natural equilibrium in which false advertising actively influences rational buyers. We analyze the effects of policy under different welfare objectives and establish a set of demand and parameter conditions where policy optimally permits a positive level of false advertising. Further analysis considers some wider issues including the implications for product investment and industry self-regulation.
Mots-clés
Misleading Advertising; Product Quality; Pass-through; Self-Regulation;
Codes JEL
- D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief
- L15: Information and Product Quality • Standardization and Compatibility
- M37: Advertising
Remplacé par
Andrew Rhodes et Chris Wilson, « False Advertising », The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 49, n° 2, Summer 2018, p. 348–369.
Référence
Andrew Rhodes et Chris Wilson, « False Advertising », TSE Working Paper, n° 15-614, décembre 2015, révision octobre 2017.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 15-614, décembre 2015, révision octobre 2017