Résumé
This paper discusses the literature on horizontal mergers between multi-sided platforms and argues that the Cournot model can provide useful insights into the welfare effects of such mergers. To illustrate those insights, we develop a simple model in which two-sided platforms offer a homogeneous service and compete à la Cournot, and derive the effects of "average-marginal-cost-preserving" mergers on consumers on both sides of the market. We conclude with a discussion of several research avenues that could be explored to understand better the impact of horizontal mergers between multi-sided platforms.
Mots-clés
Mergers; Multi-Sided Platforms; Cournot Competition;
Codes JEL
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Remplacé par
Joao Correia da silva, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili et Joana Pinho, « Horizontal Mergers Between Multi-Sided Platforms: Insights from Cournot Competition », Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 28, n° 1, janvier 2019, p. 109–124.
Référence
Joao Correia da silva, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili et Joana Pinho, « Horizontal Mergers Between Multi-Sided Platforms: Insights from Cournot Competition », TSE Working Paper, n° 18-946, août 2018.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 18-946, août 2018