Résumé
This paper extends the reputational cheap-talk model to study the effect of media market structure on the quality of news, depending on news coverage characterized by: (i) the precision of common priors and (ii) the likelihood of follow-up quality assessment. We find that competition (weakly) increases the quality of news, except when the news covers controversial issues, the quality of which is likely to remain uncertain, such as politics. Competition adversely affects the quality of such news by increasing the elasticity of demand, thereby creating incentives to confirm common priors.
Mots-clés
quality of news; competition; reputational cheap-talk;
Codes JEL
- L82: Entertainment • Media
- L10: General
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Référence
Elena Panova, « Media market structure and confirmatory news », TSE Working Paper, n° 24-1597, novembre 2024, révision 10 mars 2025.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 24-1597, novembre 2024, révision 10 mars 2025