Résumé
This paper develops a new framework for studying multiproduct intermediaries when consumers demand multiple products and face search frictions. We show that a multiproduct intermediary is proÖtable even when it does not improve consumer search e¢ ciency. In its optimal product selection, it stocks high-value products exclusively to attract consumers to visit, then proÖts by selling non-exclusive products which are relatively cheap to buy from upstream suppliers. However, relative to the social optimum, the intermediary tends to be too big and stock too many products exclusively. As applications we use the framework to study the optimal design of a shopping mall, and the impact of direct-to-consumer sales by upstream suppliers on the retail market.
Mots-clés
intermediaries; product range; multiproduct demand; search; direct-to-consumer sales; product range; exclusivity;
Codes JEL
- D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief
- L42: Vertical Restraints • Resale Price Maintenance • Quantity Discounts
- L81: Retail and Wholesale Trade • e-Commerce
Remplacé par
Andrew Rhodes, Makoto Watanabe et Jidong Zhou, « Multiproduct Intermediaries », Journal of Political Economy, vol. 129, n° 2, février 2021, p. 421–464.
Référence
Andrew Rhodes, Makoto Watanabe et Jidong Zhou, « Multiproduct Intermediaries », TSE Working Paper, n° 17-857, octobre 2017, révision mai 2020.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 17-857, octobre 2017, révision mai 2020