Résumé
The Pareto principle is often viewed as a mild requirement compatible with a variety of value judgements. In particular, it is generally thought that it can accommodate different degress of inequality aversion. We show that this is generally not true in time consistent intertemporal models where some uncertainty prevails.
Mots-clés
inequality aversion; Pareto principle; uncertainty;
Codes JEL
- D6: Welfare Economics
- D7: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D81: Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Référence
Antoine Bommier et Stéphane Zuber, « The Pareto Principle of Optimal Inequality », TSE Working Paper, n° 09-132, décembre 2009.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 09-132, décembre 2009