Résumé
We study personalized pricing in a general oligopoly model. The impact of personalized pricing relative to uniform pricing hinges on the degree of market coverage. If market conditions are such that coverage is high (e.g., the production cost is low, or the number of firms is high), personalized pricing harms firms and benefits consumers, whereas the opposite is true if coverage is low. When only some firms have data to personalize prices, consumers can be worse off compared to when either all or no firms personalize prices.
Mots-clés
personalized pricing; competition; price discrimination; consumer data;
Codes JEL
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Remplacé par
Andrew Rhodes et Jidong Zhou, « Personalized Pricing and Competition », American Economic Review, vol. 114, n° 7, juillet 2024, p. 2141–2170.
Référence
Andrew Rhodes et Jidong Zhou, « Personalized Pricing and Competition », TSE Working Paper, n° 22-1333, mai 2022, révision mars 2024.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 22-1333, mai 2022, révision mars 2024