Résumé
We study a platform's incentives to delist IP-infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for the presence of such products on innovation and consumer welfare. For a given number of buyers, platform liability increases innovation by reducing the competitive pressure faced by innovators. However, there can be a misalignment of interests between innovators and buyers. Furthermore, platform liability can have unintended consequences, which overturn the intended effect on innovation. Platform liability tends to increase (decrease) innovation and consumer welfare if the elasticity of participation of innovators is high (low) and that of buyers is low (high).
Mots-clés
Platform, Liability, Intellectual Property, Innovation.;
Codes JEL
- K40: General
- K42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- K13: Tort Law and Product Liability • Forensic Economics
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L86: Information and Internet Services • Computer Software
Référence
Doh-Shin Jeon, Yassine Lefouili et Leonardo Madio, « Platform Liability and Innovation », TSE Working Paper, n° 22-1361, septembre 2022, révision février 2024.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 22-1361, septembre 2022, révision février 2024