Document de travail

Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity

Renato Gomes et Andrea Mantovani

Résumé

Online intermediaries greatly expand consumer information, but also raise sellers’ marginal costs by charging high commissions. To prevent disintermediation, some platforms adopted price parity and anti-steering provisions, which restrict sellers’ ability to use alternative sales channels. Whether to uphold, reform, or ban these provisions has been at the center of the policy debate, but, so far, little consensus has emerged. As an alternative, this paper studies how to cap platforms’ commissions. The utilitarian cap reflects the Pigouvian precept according to which the platform should charge net fees no greater than the informational externality it exerts on other market participants.

Mots-clés

platforms, price parity; regulation; commission caps; extreme value theory;

Codes JEL

  • D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief
  • L10: General
  • L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

Remplacé par

Renato Gomes et Andrea Mantovani, « Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity », Journal of the European Economic Association, 2024, à paraître.

Référence

Renato Gomes et Andrea Mantovani, « Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity », TSE Working Paper, n° 22-1325, mars 2022.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 22-1325, mars 2022