Abstract
We analyze significant challenges and pitfalls faced by antitrust authorities in the implementation of competition policies particularly against naked cartels and propose measures principled in economic theory to circumvent these issues. We review leniency programs in different jurisdictions, the private versus public control of cartels, as well as the determination of cartel fines and other punishment instruments. Regarding cartel fines, we first discuss the sometimes-conflicting objectives of restitution and deterrence, then the economic-based versus legal- and proportional-based punishment. Moreover, we assess the proper modeling of cartel dynamics including the probability of detection and conviction, the relevant cartel duration, and the estimation of but-for prices and cartel overcharges.
Keywords
Cartels; Fines; Competition Policy; Antitrust; Dynamics;
Replaces
Marcel Boyer, Anne Catherine Faye, and Rachidi Kotchoni, “Challenges and Pitfalls in Cartel Policy and Fining”, TSE Working Paper, n. 17-852, October 2017.
Reference
Marcel Boyer, Anne Catherine Faye, E. Gravel, and Rachidi Kotchoni, “Challenges and Pitfalls in Cartel Policy and Fining”, Canadian Competition Law Review, vol. 31, n. 1, September 2018, pp. 50–82.
See also
Published in
Canadian Competition Law Review, vol. 31, n. 1, September 2018, pp. 50–82