Information disclosure in preemption races:Blessing or (winner's) curse?

Abstract

Firms receiving independent signals on a common-value risky project compete to be the first to invest. When firms are symmetric and competition is winner-take-all, rents are fully dissipated in equilibrium and the extent to which signals are publicly disclosed is irrelevant for welfare. When disclosure of signals is asymmetric, welfare is highest when firms are most asymmetric, and policies that uniformly promote disclosure may backfire, especially when competition is severe. When firms strategically select their disclosure policies, a moderate subsidy for disclosure induces a low correlation between firms' policies, and thus maximizes welfare.

Replaced by

Catherine Bobtcheff, Raphaël Levy, and Thomas Mariotti, “Information disclosure in preemption races: Blessing or (winner's) curse?”, The RAND Journal of Economics, 2024, forthcoming.

Reference

Catherine Bobtcheff, Raphaël Levy, and Thomas Mariotti, “Information disclosure in preemption races:Blessing or (winner's) curse?”, TSE Working Paper, n. 21-1202, April 2021, revised February 10, 2025.