Abstract
Pay-TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on the final allocation but lead to profit redistribution along the value chain.
Keywords
Broadcasting rights; Upstream and downstream competition; Exclusivity;
JEL codes
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L42: Vertical Restraints • Resale Price Maintenance • Quantity Discounts
Replaced by
David Martimort, and Jérôme Pouyet, “Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?”, The RAND Journal of Economics, 2024, forthcoming.
Reference
David Martimort, and Jérôme Pouyet, “Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?”, TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1501, January 2024, revised July 2024.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1501, January 2024, revised July 2024