Decentralization in Autocraties

Abstract

In a model featuring two regions—one affluent and the other impoverished—the allocation of public spending is examined under an initially centralized and autocratic political process. In a stable autocracy, the decision to implement decentralization reforms hinges on a tradeoff: while centralization enables the autocrat to extract higher rents, it also results in reduced productivity in the poor region. The autocrat opts for decentralization when the negative impact on productivity outweighs the benefits of rent extraction. Moreover, under the pressure of democratic movements and growing instability, an authoritarian regime may also pursue decentralization reforms to preserve its wealth from the decisions of the poor median voter.

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Reference

Emmanuelle Auriol, and Anaïs Dahmani-Scuitti, “Decentralization in Autocraties”, European Economic Review, January 2025, forthcoming.