Abstract
This paper studies the political economy of a basic income (BI) versus a means tested welfare scheme. We show in a very simple setting that if society votes on the type of system, its generosity as well as the “severity” of means testing (if any), a BI system could only emerge in the political equilibrium under very strong and empirically implausible conditions. Instead, the political process leads to a means tested system. The necessity to draw political support does affect the design of the system, but it only implies that means testing becomes less severe so that benefits are extended also to themiddle classes. However, a fully universal system is rejected by a majority.
Keywords
Basic income; Means testing; Political support;
JEL codes
- D3: Distribution
- D7: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H2: Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H5: National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
Replaced by
Helmuth Cremer, and Kerstin Roeder, “Means testing versus basic income: the (lack of) political support for a universal allowance”, Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136, November 2015, pp. 81–84.
Reference
Helmuth Cremer, and Kerstin Roeder, “Means testing versus basic income: the (lack of) political support for a universal allowance”, TSE Working Paper, n. 15-588, July 2015.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 15-588, July 2015