Abstract
The relationship between religion and politics is explored from a theoretical standpoint. Religious clerics can be seduced by an autocrat and political stability is at stake. The autocrat's decisions consist of two measures susceptible of antagonising religious clerics: adopting secular reforms and unduly appropriating part of national wealth, which generally are complement. Compared to centralized religions, decentralized religions, such as Islam, tend to discourage secular reforms and corruption but those effects are not guaranteed if the autocrat accepts political instability. The main hypotheses and the central results of the theory are illustrated with regime case studies that refer to contemporary times.
Keywords
Autocracy; instrumentalization of religion; centralized and decentralized religion; Islam; economic development; reforms; corruption;
JEL codes
- D02: Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- N40: General, International, or Comparative
- O57: Comparative Studies of Countries
- P48: Political Economy • Legal Institutions • Property Rights • Natural Resources • Energy • Environment • Regional Studies
- Z12: Religion
Replaces
Emmanuelle Auriol, and Jean-Philippe Platteau, “The Explosive Combination of Religious Decentralisation and Autocracy: the Case of Islam”, TSE Working Paper, n. 17-759, January 2017.
Reference
Emmanuelle Auriol, and Jean-Philippe Platteau, “The Explosive Combination of Religious Decentralisation and Autocracy: the Case of Islam”, The Economics of Transition, vol. 25, n. 2, April 2017, pp. 313–350.
See also
Published in
The Economics of Transition, vol. 25, n. 2, April 2017, pp. 313–350