David Martimort

David Martimort, and Thierry Verdier, “From Inside the Growth Process”, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 1, n. 2-3, April 2003.

Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Jean-Jacques Laffont, and David Martimort, “Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information”, The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 70, n. 2, 2003, pp. 253–280.

Antoine Faure-Grimaud, and David Martimort, “Regulatory Inertia”, The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 34, n. 3, Fall 2003, pp. 413–438.

David Martimort, and Lars Stole, “Contractual Externalities in Common Agency Games”, Advances in Theoretical Economics, vol. 3, n. 1, 2003.

David Martimort, and Lars Stole, “The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency”, Econometrica, vol. 70, n. 4, July 2002, pp. 1659–1673.

Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Jean-Jacques Laffont, and David Martimort, “Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion”, Contributions to Theoretical Economics, vol. 2, n. 1, 2002.

David Martimort, “Optimal Taxation and Strategic Budget Deficit Under Political Regime Switching”, The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 68, n. 3, July 2001, pp. 573–593.

Antoine Faure-Grimaud, and David Martimort, “On Some Agency Costs of Intermediated Contracting”, Economics Letters, n. 71, 2001, pp. 75–81.

Jean-Jacques Laffont, and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press, 2001.

Bruno Biais, David Martimort, and Jean-Charles Rochet, “Competing Mechanisms in a Commun Value Environment”, Econometrica, vol. 68, n. 4, July 2000, pp. 799–837.

Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Jean-Jacques Laffont, and David Martimort, “A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs”, Annals of Economics and Finance, vol. 1, May 2000, pp. 231–263.

Jean-Jacques Laffont, and David Martimort, “Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation”, Econometrica, vol. 68, n. 2, March 2000, pp. 309–342.

Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Jean-Jacques Laffont, and David Martimort, “The Endogenous Transaction Costs of Delegated Auditing”, European Economic Review, vol. 43, n. 4-6, April 1999, pp. 1039–1048.

Jean-Jacques Laffont, and David Martimort, “Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior”, The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 30, n. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 232–262.

Jean-Jacques Laffont, and David Martimort, “The Collusion-Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 1, n. 4, 1999, pp. 399–438.

David Martimort, “The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies : Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs”, The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 66, 1999, pp. 929–948.

David Martimort, “Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 88, n. 2, 1999, pp. 261–294.

Jean-Jacques Laffont, and David Martimort, “Transaction Costs, Institution Design and the Separation of Powers”, European Economic Review, vol. 42, 1998, pp. 673–684.

Jean-Jacques Laffont, and David Martimort, “Collusion and Delegation”, The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 29, n. 2, 1998, pp. 280–305.

Jean-Jacques Laffont, and David Martimort, “Collusion Under Asymmetric Information”, Econometrica, vol. 65, n. 4, July 1997, pp. 875–911.