Abstract
The European Union is increasingly using antidumping (AD) procedures to better regulate international trade. At a time when we are talking about the progressive rise of a globalization among friends, it is necessary to clarify all the economic mechanisms that lead to the adoption of an AD duty. This paper shows that the misperception of the quality of an imported good is an effective explanation of AD duties. In particular, we show that questioning the quality of goods imported from a country significantly increases the probability of initiating AD investigations against that country. The evidence is both theoretical and empirical and focuses on trade relations between the European Union and China.
Keywords
Dumping; Price undertaking; Quality; European Union; China;
JEL codes
- C35: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models • Discrete Regressors • Proportions
- F1: Trade
- F12: Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies • Fragmentation
- F13: Trade Policy • International Trade Organizations
- F16: Trade and Labor Market Interactions
Reference
Patrice Cassagnard, and Mamadou Thiam, “How does consumer quality misperception change European Union antidumping actions?”, Review of World Economics, vol. 160, n. 2, July 2024, pp. 1–29.
Published in
Review of World Economics, vol. 160, n. 2, July 2024, pp. 1–29