Optimal income taxation with tax avoidance and endogenous labor supply

Abstract

I determine the optimal income tax schedule when individuals both choose endogenously their labour supply and have the possibility of avoiding paying taxes. Considering a convex concealment cost function, I propose a formula for the optimal marginal tax rate, that generalizes the formula of the standard Mirrlees model to the case of tax avoidance. I also show that the results obtained by Casamatta (2021) in the fixed income case hold true when labour supply is endogenous: with a low enough marginal cost of avoidance, it is optimal to let some taxpayers, located in the interior of the skill distribution, avoid taxes.

Reference

Georges Casamatta, “Optimal income taxation with tax avoidance and endogenous labor supply”, Canadian Journal of Economics, Toronto, vol. 56, n. 3, August 2023, pp. 919–939.