Public Goods and Future Audiences

Abstract

Individuals’ decisions to behave prosocially (or the contrary) can often be observed by other individuals, with no direct connection to them, but who may nevertheless be influenced by them (e.g. through social media). Does knowing that they may be viewed as role models by other, notably younger, people affect the way individuals behave? Does it make them more likely to behave prosocially? We study how participants’ behavior in an experimental public good game is affected when they know that information about their choices and outcomes, together with different sets of information about their identity, will be transmitted the following year to a set of new, unknown, first-year students at the same university. When subjects know their photo, choices and outcomes will be transmitted, they contribute significantly less. We explore different possible explanations and are able to rule out several. We argue that the most convincing are based on non-standard social image concerns (i.e. individuals are not trying to signal prosocial motivations).

Keywords

JEL codes

Replaces

Giuseppe Marco Attanasi, Roberta Dessi, Frédéric Moisan, and Donald Robertson, “Public goods and future audiences”, TSE Working Paper, n. 17-860, November 2017, revised December 2023.

Reference

Giuseppe Marco Attanasi, Roberta Dessi, Frédéric Moisan, and Donald Robertson, “Public Goods and Future Audiences”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 224, August 2024, pp. 580–597.