Abstract
We study spousal peer effects on smoking and their implication for the health of children. Smoking decisions are modeled as equilibrium strategies of an incomplete information game within the couple. Using French data, we identify two peer effects: a smoking enhancing effect of smoking partners and a smoking deterring effect of non-smoking partners. An implication of these findings is that the smoking behavior may differ qualitatively in couples where both partners smoke and where only one partner smokes. This interpretation is supported by our finding that, controlling for total tobacco consumption of parents, the respiratory health of children is negatively affected only if both parents smoke.
Keywords
smoking; social interaction; simultaneous game model; health;
JEL codes
- C31: Cross-Sectional Models • Spatial Models • Treatment Effect Models • Quantile Regressions • Social Interaction Models
- D10: General
- I12: Health Production
Replaces
Chiara Canta, and Pierre Dubois, “Smoking within the Household: Spousal Peer Effects and Children's Health Implications”, IDEI Working Paper, n. 690, October 2011, revised January 2014.
Chiara Canta, and Pierre Dubois, “Smoking within the Household: Spousal Peer Effects and Children's Health Implications”, TSE Working Paper, n. 11-260, October 2011, revised January 2014.
Reference
Chiara Canta, and Pierre Dubois, “Smoking within the Household: Spousal Peer Effects and Children’s Health Implications”, The B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (topics), vol. 15, n. 4, September 2015, pp. 1939–1973.
See also
Published in
The B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (topics), vol. 15, n. 4, September 2015, pp. 1939–1973